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game boy

H

e 'louehed in front of the video game maehine like hundred' I've 'een befo<e, 'o I don't
know what it was about him that made me notice- and stare. With a casual, off-hand grace born of
practice and natural talent, he jiggled the knob and things on the screen bounced and whizzed and
popped, but he was unimpressed. He had the kind of blond crop that moved in a solid sheet of
smooth gold falling over his eyes, the back of his head almost shaved, and he seemed scarcely to
notice the smaller, more urgent littler boys jostling around him for a turn, a look, word of recognition. He was only eleven or maybe twelve, he was king of the hill, and though his manner was
calculated to look as though he didn't know it, he knew it. A young prince in the Pizza Hut.
What made me look at him so closely was the weird opposition between his almost regal airfine, chiseled features and slender, well-proportioned body-and his clothes. A rim of boxer shorts
showed all around his middle above his baggy cut-offs, carefully torn at the bottom. Below the
knees, his legs, with no discernable muscle as yet, stretched downward into shoes quite notably
enormous, each certainly bigger than a breadbox. They were stunningly white and black, with
elaborate patterns of stitching, a variety of textures and a vocabulary of messages in words, or parts
of words. And they were huge. So was his shirt, a tank top which was supposed to belong to Scottie
Pippen, and which would nearly have fit him, but dropped artfully down from the tiny shoulders of
the boy, tucked in at places behind the boxers so that his audience could observe that the proper
relation had been achieved between boxers, tank, shorts and body.
I really wondered if he could move at all in those shoes, but when his family's pizza came, and
his mom called him over to their table, he went right away, and even seemed sprightly enough, if
not exactly light on his feet. His quickness in answering the summons made me think he must be a
nice boy, and, at this stage, even eager to please. I thought of him in a classroom, and wondered
what could possibly be the connection between me and him.
Not Macbeth, surely, the work I was currently preparing for a first year class in Christ College
this semester. Though Shakespeare is not, as we quaintly put it, my field, I know a fair amount
about Shakespeare. I've made it a priority to see a lot on the stage over the years, and I've taught
many plays in a number of settings. I like to see a play and argue with others about the ideas that
have been embodied in front of us in the previous three hours. I love the florid richness and precision
of Shakespeare's language, and I believe in what I think of as a connection made between me and
others throughout ages who have also thrilled to his language and ideas. But can I make a connection
between me, and Shakespeare, and the boy playing video games in the pizza restaurant in my neighborhood?
Some years ago I was surer that I could. But this boy seems to have moved away from me into
a world whose rules and values are much stranger to me than those of Dunsinane or Arden. Take,
just for instance, his shoes, which I estimate to have cost three times the price of the Riverside
Edition of Shakespeare's complete plays. Is the difference in value which we would assign to those
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two things a meaningful difference? What would make a person want to wear those shoes, I ask
myself, and I cannot come up with an answer that makes the wearing of them comprehensible. And
much more so for the boxer shorts puffing up around the pants, and the falling-off-the-shoulder
tank top with someone else's name written on it. I choose to believe that the boy's choice of clothing
has meaning, but I am lost when I ask what the meaning is, beyond an admiration of the current
black urban hipster sketched in every line of the costume. Though the recent Romeo and Juliet with
a Miami gang flavor shows an affinity between contemporary black city manners (at least those with
which we are familiar via television drama) and Renaissance extravagant violence, I wonder whether
these affinities will work for our young man at the video controls. And if we cannot teach him
Shakespeare, what will we teach him and why?
Reformation is the season for which this issue is named, and in the issue are a number of things
about church and nation, about the way public life is lived out in view of commitments of church
and to the beliefs that the church sustains. Those beliefs, hammered out in a world more like
Shakespeare's world than ours, must find expression in ways that make them not only teachable but
compelling in our world. Because one imagines the boy, good-naturedly curious, looking at the odd
bits and pieces of belief he manages to pick up as though they were shards of a civilization too
strange to understand.
Let's hope he says something like, "Awesome!" and shoves off, shoelaces dragging, to find
someone who can tell him what they mean.
Peace,
GME

THE CELLO

The cello cannot laugh.
It must cry and paint
old dreams and memories
around us.
Chrysanthemums withering
in snow.
Those are cello flowers.
A cemetery where
tears speak.
The cello sings
life's funeral,
feathers and birds
of death ..

Marion Schoeberlein
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On the Ima~ of God and Man in the
Unborn -child
Richard Stith
Ronald Dworkin, who has been called the leading legal philosopher in the English-speaking world,
has lately devoted his talents to the advocacy of death, especially in the influential New York Review of
Books. Dworkin's 1993 book Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual
Freedom insists that the less profitable investment in each being, the less regrettable the killing of that
being. Richard Stith's lengthy critique of Dworkin's theory appeared in the Maryland Law Review Vol. 56,
No. 2 (1997) under the title "On Death and Dworkin: A Critique of his Theory of Inviolability." The
following is a portion of Professor Stith's argument for equal human dignity before birth, part of his
continuing effort to establish a grounds for communication between the Pro-choice and Pro-life camps.
The Editor

I t seems to me obviorn that people ruce eductant to abort to the degeee to whioh they think the
fetus is like a baby, given the overwhelming consensus that infanticide is wrong. Moreover,
discussing the nature of the newborn infant and of infanticide is about as close as we can get to the
abortion controversy without entering into it. Therefore, an examination of our feeling of respect
for newborn life is an appropriate way to begin to discern a possible basis for agreement with regard
to unborn life.
Dworkin himself says very little about the dignity or inviolability of infant life. But he does
bring up two major reasons traditionally given for why human life in general ought not to be
violated: that another's life is her or God's property (Life's Dominion, hereafter L.D., 214), and
that it is made in the image of something noble or divine (L.D. 82).
The property explanation rings true to some degree. The fact that something belongs to
another is a strong reason not to harm it. Of course, the assumption of divine ownership would
make us quite a bit more reluctant.
However, a major problem for the property idea, particularly in its theistic form, is that it is
too strong an explanation. The whole universe is made by God, just as much as are human beings,
yet non-human creation does not share anywhere near the same degree of inviolability. If it is argued
that God delegated to humanity his authority over his non-human possessions, this raises the
question of why God would do so and amounts to an admission that the property notion cannot be
a sufficient explanation for the special respect due to human life.
Moreover, the feel of property rights is too cool and insufficiently honorific to capture the
sense of sanctity or inviolability. We just do not experience anything near admiration or awe for
another's property. Nor do we think that the respect we owe another's property responds in any
way to an intrinsic characteristic of that property. Being wholly extrinsic to the thing owned,
ownership cannot explain our sense of the intrinsic dignity of the human individual.
Dworkin himself rightly lays much more emphasis on another explanation for the respectworthiness of human life: that it is made in the "image" of God or of man. Certainly he is correct
that the "dominant Western religious traditions insist that God made humankind 'in His own image'
and that each individual human being is a representation, and not merely a product, of a divine
creator" (L.D. 82). Moreover, the Hebrew scriptures (Genesis 9:6) give the fact that people are
made in God's image as the reason that murder must receive the most severe punishment. And
Dworkin is also right in discerning a secular analogue: that a human individual is an instance, an
image, of a uniquely noble form of being. Each of us is at the least an image and presence of
humanity, if not of divinity. To the degree that our species elicits wonder and respect, each instance
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of it must do so.
There is a yet deeper and perhaps even stronger reason for our respect for human form:
recognition of self. We identify with others once they appear to be essentially like us. If they share
our self-image, they are our "kind." And as soon as another person is seen as "one of us," she
becomes a co-subject, an alter ego, rather than only an object-a source of value rather than a thing
to be valued. She becomes, like our own ego or self, a given and inviolable starting point for
premoral and moral reflection and action. Thus the Pope recently founded the dignity of others in a
recognition of self: Adam knew Eve as a person because, unlike all prior creation, she was "flesh of
his flesh and bone of his bones." (Evangelium Vitae§ 35, 24 Origins: CNS Documentary Service
689, 702 (1995), quoting from Genesis 2:23.) An attack on Eve was thus an attack on Adam.
We should note in passing that neither the theistic nor the nontheistic theories of the dignity
of the human image are "speciesist" in the sense of evincing an arbitrary preference for humanity
over other species. The first type of theory would respect the divine image not only in humans but
wherever it might occur-e.g. in angels. The second would accord to every species capable of moral
acts the duty to give special recognition to its own kind.
But in what way could it be said that a newborn infant is an image of God or of ourselves?
What is that divine or human image or essence and how does it present itself in the infant? Mere
body and facial shape cannot be the whole answer or we would feel a similar respect for the great
apes and even for statues of humans. Nor can the reason be the infant's rudimentary sort of
consciousness or ability to feel pain, or endearing behavior, for these are shared by many beasts.
Clearly, those attributes that may serve to distinguish our species-and which some of us would
consider divine-do not arise until quite some time after birth. Human intelligence, speech, rational
choice, principled conscience, sacrificial love: such qualities do not yet manifest themselves in the
infant.
What the human infant does have, and other species seem not to have, is the potentiality
for these things, understood not as mere possibility but as self-actualizing design. (I shall try to avoid
the word "potentiality" in the rest of this article, because potentiality can stand ambiguously both
for possibility and for design. We can say both "Every infant is a potential English speaker" and
"Every infant is a potential speaker." But there is nothing at all in any child specifically designed for
English, whereas every child is designed, from its genes to its brain and tongue, for speech.) There is
a human form or nature at work in every baby, latent but active. An infant's smile is more than a
bodily movement; it is a harbinger of communication and community. The image we respect and
revere lies in what the child is designed to do, not yet in what the child does.
Put another way, that image is part of the infant's being, though not yet of its appearing.
But appearing cannot be crucial. If we were to say that the actual expression of speech or of some
other specifically human quality were necessary for human dignity, then that dignity would be only
an epiphenomenon, an ephemeral divine flicker emerging from otherwise profane matter. People
would fade out of personhood as they tired each evening, and we would entirely lose respect for
their lives once they were dreamlessly asleep. This we do not do. We respect the human image even
when it is not appearing, when it is subsisting merely as a capacity or, in the infant, as a selfdeveloping potentiality.
There is yet another, related way to understand the recognition of self, the image of
humanity, present in the newborn child. Pace Dworkin, a child is begotten, not made. That which
parents beget is an extension of their own being. Adam's son Seth, like all sons and daughters, was
"in his own likeness, after his image" (Genesis 5 :30). Theological wars were once fought over
whether Christ was made or begotten by the Father, precisely because it was thought that only
begetting could found complete unity of image and thus of being. The bond of origin assures the
bond of being. To question the humanity of a newborn infant would be to suggest that human being
might be discontinuous, that humans might engender offspring of another species that only later
turn into humans.
Moreover, the human image in an infant is active rather than passive. Because the child is
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alive, its latent human image or nature strives to manifest and maintain itself. Of course, this is true
of all life. We distinguish individual living creatures (whether or not they are human) from inanimate
matter (and from nearby living creatures) by each creature's separate systemic autonomy, i.e. its
capacity to regulate and direct its own equilibrium (homeostasis) rather than being entirely subject
to external forces.
A pile of rocks has only a passive unity. It does not reconstitute itself if it is kicked over,
does not regulate and control itself, does not respond and adapt to its environment. It is not an
autonomous system. Any form it has is purely the product of external forces. By contrast, a living
creature seeks to repair itself if it is disrupted by some external attack, not only in each part as
crystals might do, but as a whole. It monitors and governs itself, so to speak. This is what makes it a
unified being in the first place, rather than just a "collection of body parts," which is what Dworkin
calls Frankenstein's pre-activated monster (L. D. 19). Of course, an external attack may overwhelm
and destroy a living creature, but it retains the status of a life as long as it actively resists disintegration.
My dog is thus distinct from a pile of stones because it is a single autonomous system and
the pile is not. And it is distinct from other dogs (i.e. is a separate life, a particular dog) because it
and the others have unconnected maintenance mechanisms, are not part of some larger selfgoverning biological system. That is, it and other dogs are related simply in the way of rocks or in
other ways which are far less perfectly integrative than biological unity.
Most living systems also develop (homeorrhesis). They do not remain static, but grow. As
they grow, the parts of each system may be partially or totally replaced. The material in my cells
now may be entirely different from that which I had as a child. But I am the same living individual
because I am the same system, and I am the same system because I am still governed by the same
image, the same form, the same nature. A being's historical continuity and identity is one of form,
not matter.
Although we may thus feel respect for all life because of the inner dynamic shaping it,
human life is unique because the power at work in it is unique. That power is designed and directed,
even in the infant, toward human and (according to some) divine communion. The presence of the
developing image of fulfilled humanity is what makes the infant one of our kind and accounts for
our sense of the special inviolability of newborn human life over that of other species.
One source of our qualms about abortion is thus obvious and independent of any religious
faith. The fetus is designed to be what the infant is designed to be. The human image is latent and
active from conception, making the conceptus our kind of being, begotten by human parents and
thus a member of our species. It, like the infant, is respect-worthy as an individual human "life
developing itself," in the words of the 1975 abortion decision by the German Constitutional Court.
Systemic continuity persists from conception to maturity and on to death.
Perhaps it would be helpful here to analogize fetal to photographic development. (The
analogy is not perfect because photographs, unlike new life, do not monitor their own development.) Suppose I'm in the process of developing a picture I know I will prize and you come in
part way through the process and destroy it. To claim that feticide is not so bad as ordinary murder
is like you saying "But that photo was still in the brown-smudge stage. You don't care about brown
smudges, do you?" Once it is realized that the basis for human dignity in the newborn infant lies in
its developing human image, the idea that earlier stages of life do not much count seems outrageous,
if not indeed mad.
In other words, the compelling reasons that explain the special dignity of human infants
over other species also apply to embryos and fetuses. The bases of inherent dignity in the newborn
apply equally to the preborn-and this throughout gestation. The dignity of each stands or falls
with that of the other.
It was essentially the above argument that led the German high court in 1975 to conclude
that no distinctions may be drawn, with respect to the right to life, between the born and the unborn,
nor among the various prenatal stages of human development. To draw such distinctions would be

to hold that human nature, the latent but developing human image, is insufficient for human dignity,
and that some actualized human perfection is needed-thus undercutting the inherent inviolability
of neonatal as well as prenatal human life. In the Court's own words:
The process of development .. .is a continuing process which exhibits no sharp demarcation
and does not allow a precise division of the various steps of development of the human life.
The process does not end even with birth; the phenomena of consciousness which are specific
to the human personality, for example, appear for the first time a rather long time after birth.
Therefore, the protection ... of the Basic Law cannot be limited either to the "completed"
human being after birth or to the child about to be born which is independently capable of
living.... ; no distinction can be made here between various stages of the life developing itself
before birth, or between unborn and born life (translated in 9 f. Marshall J. Prac. and Proc. 551,
558 (1976)).
In 1993, the Constitutional Court revisited the abortion issue and once again made clear
that the protection owed to the fetus is independent of the stage of pregnancy.
Could one push this argument back further, to argue that if embryos are inviolable, then
sperm cells and ova must also be? The answer is "no." Neither sperm nor egg contains a latent
complete human image, nor does either grow. Dworkin writes "When I was a just-conceived fetus ... "
(L. D. 19), but he would be unintelligible if he wrote "When I was a sperm cell. .. " He is in fact a
grown-up fetus, but he is not a grown-up sperm cell. Nor could he say "When I was still a separate
sperm and ovum . .. " because, prior to conception, the sperm and ovum are far more like nearby
rocks in a collection than they are like a single organism-in that prior to conception there was no
immanent design directing those particular cells to form young Ronald. He was not there in them.
They came together only through chance and external forces.
Put another way, latent potentiality in the sense of an immanent design (image, form,
essence, nature, kind, species) is radically distinct from mere possibility, as mentioned above. Either
may exist without the other. Prior to conception, a new individual life is possible, but an active
design has not yet come into being. Likewise, in a severely disabled person, there may no longer be
any possibility of human expression, although the striving for human perfection has not been lost.
The paraplegic may never walk again. The comatose person may never again speak. Yet the body of
the first is still designed for walking and that of the second still aims at speaking. Their human
nature or design remains unchanged, even though it must remain unfulfilled. Insofar as the person
with severe disabilities remains anything, she remains a human being, one of our kind. Her life
remains therefore inviolable.
We use the idea of design in this way not only in regard to humans but in regard to all other
living creatures. A dog that has lost a leg is still called a dog, even though it is correct to say that the
nature of a dog is to have four legs and even though an otherwise dog-like animal belonging to some
odd three-legged species would probably not be called a dog by us. A living entity does not join a
different species by being crippled. It is thus false as well as demeaning to call a person with grave
disabilities a "vegetable," as Dworkin repeatedly does (e.g., L.D. 180, 188, 212, 216). Indeed, it is
only because she remains human that her condition is tragic. We do not feel saddened every time we
visit someone's garden and observe all the tomatoes just vegetating there.
In Life's Dominion, Dworkin admits his inability to explain why so many feel that the fetus
somehow acquires greater dignity and inviolability once it comes to "resemble" an infant (L.D. 8689). This feeling is quite understandable, though ultimately incomplete, in light of the theory
developed above. If it is self-developing human nature that elicits reverence and respect in the
newborn, it makes perfect sense that many would have those same attitudes toward the unborn only
after the appearance of a human form, sometime around eight to ten weeks after conception. It is
only thereafter that ordinary human sensibility would say naturally "there is a baby growing in the
womb. "Prior to that time it is natural to think that a baby is only being made, rather than growingi.e. that organs are being added one by one as the embryo is gradually shaped into a human being.
Such indeed was the nearly universal premodern theory of human generation. Knowing
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neither of the ovum nor of conception in our modern sense, Job says to God, "Did you not pour me
out like milk and curdle me like cheese?" Gob 10:10). Only after this "curdling" was a human form
apparently present. Before that moment, Job sees God as an external source of activity and design,
giving human form to semen. Dworkin argues (L.D. 41-42) that Aquinas thought that the human
individual began only after the fetus received a human form and thus could take charge of its own
development, though he ascribed the prior organizing design to its human father rather than directly
to God as does Job.
We should not be surprised if such theories find less inviolability in very early life.
Essentially, they imagine that the early embryo is being constructed (by God or by another outside
force) rather than developing. And things that are merely made lack inviolability at least until the
point where they acquire form and thus unity; an amorphous collection of stones or of body parts
cannot be violated.
In truth, however, waiting for the appearance of human form in the fetus is radically
mistaken. As we noted, mere bodily similarity to us cannot be the reason for the importance of
resemblance or we would likewise find apes and statues inviolable. Rather, resemblance is taken to
mean identity of nature or kind, of the latent design for human community. But this design is in fact
present from the first moments after conception-and not as some passive blueprint for some builder
to use, but as an active self-directing power. The embryo derives only food, not form, from its environment. Of course, that inherent form is not yet visible; it at first subsists only as a moving, growing
complex of DNA. But from the beginning a human image gives a human embryo a human nature
and a continuity of being from conception to full development. Even in the conceptus, one can see
an active human image with one's mind, though not yet with one's eyes. It is irrational to object to
the destruction of a photo only after it has been partially developed but not while it is still in on~s
camera. Once one knows that the prized image is present, its stage of development is a triviality.

y

WHY WE GO TO THE DOCTOR
People stop touching us.
We are like chiffoniers with tiny legs in museums,
wood that has lost its grain,
goldfish mouthing the surface.
Before the aspen trembles into June
and the creeper gets back its green,
a farmhouse will be abandoned
and those that once linked arms.
From pier to pier we go,
pigeons making their throaty sounds
under the bridge,
pods of homeostasis.

If words are flesh,
for just this moment let me touch your hand,
and look into your eyes,
and make the moment fast.

William Aiken

Professor Richard Stith
is a
member of
the faculty ofVU's
School of Law.
He retains
copyright
to this article.

of the same mind

Louise Williams

If there is any encouragement in Christ, any consolation from love, any sharing in the Spirit, any compassion
and sympathy, make my joy complete: be of the same mind, having the same love, being in full accord and of
one mind. Do nothing from selfish ambition or conceit, but in humility regard others as better than yourselves.
Let each of you look not to your own interests, but to the interests of others. Let the same mind be in you that
was in Christ jesus,
who, though he was in the form of God,
did not regard equality with God
as something to be exploited,
but emptied himself,
taking the form of a slave,
being born in human likeness.
And being found in human form,
he humbled himself
and became obedient to the point of deatheven death on a cross.
Therefore God also highly exalted him
and gave him the name
that is above every name,
so that at the name oflesus
every knee should bend,
in heaven and on earth and under the earth,
and every tongue confess
that jesus Christ is Lord,
to the glory of God the Father.
Therefore, my beloved, just as you have always obeyed me, not only in my presence, but much more now in my
absence, work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who is at work in you, enabling
you both to will and to work for his good pleasure.

Philippians 2:1-13

p
hap• you know what it i• like, at lmt a little bit, to have a lonptanding "lation•hip, a
friendship where you have shared common experiences and values. Where each of you has given
and received depending on who has needs and who has something to offer. A relationship where
you have mutual respect and trust, where you know each other pretty well and can almost predict
what will cause problems for each other along the way and what will give joy to each other. A relationship where you can say what is really on your heart. Maybe you have known such a relationship.
Paul, the apostle, and the Christian congregation at Philippi had just such a relationship. And
now Paul in prison writes to his friends from the heart. But this is not a letter addressed to an individual. It's not even a kind of chain letter addressed to a series of individuals. Rather it is written to
a community, a community of faith, a community in Christ.
It seems that Paul has heard that there are tensions, jealousies, disagreements, divisions in the
community. And knowing them the way he does, he has a pretty good idea of what's getting them in
trouble. He knows the stresses and strains that happen when people are jockeying for position and
10
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thinking only of themselves. He knows the problems when people have differing opinions and
points of view-over whether or not people have to be circumcised and become Jews before they
can be good Christians, or over politics, or over what kind of music should be used in worship, or
over residence hall visitation hours, or over the roles that women should have in leadership, or over
the kinds of priorities a university like ours should really have, or over whatever. Differences like
those can lead to bickering and jealousy and power plays and insistence on one's own way. Paul
knew, and the Philippians knew, and we do too how easily things like that can tear a community
apart.
Paul begins by reminding them of what they have in common-encouragement in Christ,
consolation from love, sharing in the Spirit, compassion and sympathy-things that they have experienced in their community-marks of their life together shaped by the presence of Christ. If those
things are there, then they have the capacity in faith to rise above their petty differences and to do
the hard work of living the unity that is God's gift to them. Nothing would make their friend Paul
happier, he writes.
And when we look around us here in this community we may note many differences,
differences that can put stresses and strains on unity, but perhaps by God's grace we can also look
around and see the marks of a community shaped by the presence of Christ, a people among whom
there is encouragement in Christ when people grow weary, consolation when people are hurting,
the kind of sharing in the Spirit that builds people up, and compassion and sympathy whenever
anyone has need. And perhaps with the Philippian community, we can start there to begin to live the
unity that is God's gift to us also.
At first glance-or even at second glance-it might seem that Paul is asking the Philippiansand us-to do the impossible. Or if it's not impossible, at the very least, it seems to be unhealthy. Is
he asking us to all think alike-to have the same mind? Is he asking us to become doormats for
other people to walk on? I think not.
Rather, the oneness of mind is to be found in the mind of Christ. And here Paul quotes a
beautiful hymn-perhaps a favorite piece of the liturgy that he and the Philippians sang togethera hymn that describes so beautifully Jesus Christ's self-emptying servanthood that led all the way to
the cross. There is no self-deprecating, false modesty here, only fulfillment of the true vocation of
Jesus, the Christ. And what seems to be the end is really the beginning of Jesus' exaltation by God,
an exaltation that ends with everyone in all creation worshiping Jesus Christ as Lord. You can almost
hear the hymn-the organ with all the stops open and brass and tympani and the huge congregation
singing with one voice.
But that promise is not yet quite fulfilled for the Philippians or for us. We are still here in this
fragile community trying with fear and trembling to live the unity that is God's gift.
Perhaps you have known a relationship where you were so tuned in to each other that you
almost knew what the other one was thinking and sometimes you even found yourselves thinking
the same things at the same time. Perhaps you have known such a relationship. Paul encourages the
Philippians and us in such a relationship with Christ Jesus.
We who are in Christ Jesus have access to the mind of Christ. As we attune ourselves to that
one through hearing the word, using the sacraments, praying, being part of the give and take of the
community of faith, talking with each other, more and more the mind of Christ becomes our mind
and we can see those other people-even with all our differences-not as threats or competitors,
but as people in whom God is also working, as people who like us are trying to become attuned to
the mind of Christ-people whom we can love, at least once in a while, wlh Christ's own selfgiving love. Nothing could make God-or us-happier. May it be so. Amen. T
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of us have probably heard before. Yet what distinguishes these two sociologists from other critics is
their gloomy judgment that present-day liberalism and consumerism have utterly and unprecedentedly transformed-and deformed-Westerners' religious sensibilities in the late twentieth
century.
Despite different personal viewpoints (Bruce is an avowed agnostic, Hunter a committed
Christian), their evaluations of the contemporary religious scene are strikingly similar. Both anchor
their analyses in a historical sketch of the emergence of liberal-capitalist culture; both see a
consumerist ethos and a liberal emphasis on "tolerance" and "choice" as powerfully reshaping
religious sensibilities in general and attitudes toward church authority in particular; both paint an
exceedingly bleak (though not necessarily secular) picture of the future of organized religion.
The linchpin to both arguments is the claim that the emergent, American-led global consumer
culture ("McWorld") and the liberal commitment to privatizing religion and "autonomous individualism" threaten to undermine and stigmatize all forms of traditional, "external" religious authority.
Religious authority, argues Hunter, has been privatized, subjectivized, and fragmented in contemporary society: a market-driven cacophony of individuals' choices establishes the sole conditions of
possibility for modern-day religious belief and behavior. The ever expanding extension of private
choice to religious matters, according to Hunter, has greatly attenuated the "serene certainty" and
"binding address" that comes when religious views are transmitted from one generation to the next
in a particular religious tradition. Hunter identifies the "seeker church" movement within American
evangelicalism as exemplary of the corrosive effects of "late modernity." To quote Hunter at length:
In this [seeker church] movement, the shopping mall becomes the paradigm of organizational
effort. Marketing research is used to determine what insiders call the "felt needs" of the
consumers. Rather than preaching what the tradition always held to be true, ministry has now
come to be oriented toward satisfying the psychological and emotional needs of those in the
pew.... The very content of what is preached is determined less by the historical traditions of
the church as by the felt needs of the parishioner. In this, the organizational seat of authority is
no longer the church but the parishioner him or herself. The consumer, even of truth, has
become sovereign.

If conservative American evangelicalism has so succumbed to the cultural imperatives of modernity,
Hunter reasons that his analysis is even more applicable to traditions such as liberal Protestantism
or Reform Judaism, which long ago ditched orthodoxy for cultural accommodation. Although
religious conservatives still reject modernity in their rhetoric, Hunter concludes that their behavior
tells a different story; they too have drunk deeply from the wells of modernity and are, ironically,
contributing to the "functional nihilism" which is our public culture.
Bruce's analysis is similarly negative, but as an agnostic his tone does not betray Hunter's
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prophetic anguish. Moreover, since Bruce focuses more broadly on the religious climate of the
liberal West, instead of just America, his analysis has more sensitivity to particular nationalities
and political cultures. Nonetheless, the driving force of his argument is similar to Hunter's. For
Bruce, the legacies of the Reformation and the Enlightenment bequeathed to Western culture a
pervasive spirit of individualism. When coupled with the market imperatives of industrial and
postindustrial capitalism, this spirit becomes an acid that dissolves religious communal bonds and
traditional authority. "[P]eople who get involved in religion [today]," notes Bruce, "do so in a
highly selective and picky way. Like the sovereign consumers they believe themselves to be in
other spheres of their lives, they decide what works for them and how involved they will become .
. . .There is no longer the idea that there is one truth, one correct body of knowledge. If it works
for you, it is true."
Bruce offers a fourfold schema of religious development in the West since the Reformation:
the period of the church, the sect, the denomination, and the cult. Each era represents an increase
in individualism and subjectivism from the one which preceding it. In place of a bygone ideal of
the "one true way," we face a "cultic milieu" today in which a radical religious individualism fully
reflects the ascendant market economy and liberal political ethos. To clarify, Bruce does not
define "the cultic" solely as fanatical groups cut off from society; rather he refers primarily to the
piecemeal and individualistic way in which people "do religion" in a consumer-friendly, liberal
society. For him, "New Age" spirituality typifies the present religious moment. In his analogy,
New Agers (but also those in search of traditional religious experience) behave like customers at
a candy counter. Their desire for a "mix of sweets" suited to personal tastes represents for Bruce
"the dominant ethos of late capitalism: the world of options, lifestyles, and preferences."
Furthermore, Bruce comments that the idea of liberal tolerance supporting such "New Age"
eclecticism, though encouraging individual belief, paves the way for the disintegration of any
sense of shared communal truth. As Bruce puts it:
There is one major sense in which the New Age is a perfect product of its time: an exemplification of modernity.. . .It is individualism raised to a new plane. The eclecticism of the
New Age is not just a matter of being tolerant of behavioral differences or of supposing that
we all have an equal right to act as we wish provided it is does not harm others. It is going
further than that to suppose not only that we can all discern the truth, but that we all
variously discern the truth. The individual consumer is not only the final arbiter of what he
or she wants to believe and practice but also the final arbiter of truth and falsity.
Bruce aptly calls such behavior "individualism taken to the level of epistemology" and, similarly
to Hunter, doubts whether any form of traditional religious authority, or community, can weather
this "complete relativism."
On many points, Hunter and Bruce persuade: along with other like-minded critics, they
have identified a central "cultural logic" of our time and have insightfully demonstrated how this
logic plays out in religious affairs. Yet one also cannot help but ask if their near apocalyptic tone
is justified. For one, I am a bit skeptical whether liberalism and consumerism are quite the grim
reapers to traditional religion that Hunter and Bruce suppose them to be. For historical
perspective, it would be instructive to compare Hunter and Bruce's analyses to those made by
another astute observer of religion of the last century: the Swiss-German emigre, Philip Schaff
(1819-1893). Born in Switzerland, Schaff came to America in 1844 from Germany where he had
studied and taught theology. Unlike Bruce and Hunter today, Schaff gave unreserved praise for
the American "voluntary principle" in religious matters. While he recognized that the First
Amendment and the nascent capitalist spirit were rapidly turning America-and today the
world-into a complex religious marketplace, the memory of the state-dominated and bureaucratically authoritarian churches of Protestant Germany were fresh enough in his memory for
him to pen the following:
The glory of America is free Christianity, independent of the secular government, and

supported by the .. .free people. This is one of the greatest facts in modern history. Its significance can only be fully estimated by a careful comparison with the state-churches of Europe,
both Protestant and Catholic .... Whatever the defects and inconveniences of separation of
church and state, they are less numerous and serious than the troubles and difficulties which
continually grow out of their union ....

If Schaff could visit our age, I'm sure that he would find the pessimistic visions of Bruce and Hunter
insightful, but I'm also inclined to think that he might ask these sociologists some revealing
questions. Above all, he would want to know what alternative religious authority could forestall the
religious anarchy brought about by the privatization and subjectivization of belief. Historically,
Bruce and Hunter might opt for a Puritan-like theocracy, the caesaropapism of the Orthodox
Church, or a Church-State union as in the German lands, among many other questionable, illiberal
solutions. Schaff would surely query Bruce and Hunter to see if they thought these options were
more suited to the practice of genuine religion. If we were to allow Soren Kierkegaard to join their
conversation (why not?-let's indulge our historical fancy), he might thicken the controversy by
asking if "Christendom [read: traditional external authority] was only mankind's centuries-old,
progressively successful, prolonged struggle to protect itself against Christianity?" Indeed, an
encounter with Schaff or Kierkegaard would make clear that "binding external" religious authority
often did not have the effect of encouraging genuine piety anyway. Further, these visitors from the
past might reveal that while modern sociologists have many virtues, a broad historical sense is
usually not their strongest one.
The locus of religious authority has never been unproblematic. Again, one thinks of medieval
popes endorsing the Crusades, of Lutheran Princes and the Peasant's War, of the delusions of
Anabaptist prophets, of the Salem witchcraft trials, or of Louis XIV and the "divine right of kings."
Arguably, the historical record of external religious authority is one of Christians' most convincing
testimonies of human fallenness.
But this is not to say that Bruce and Hunter have failed to identify a disquieting aspect of our
liberal-capitalist times: namely, an often facile abjuration of all normative claims of authority in
celebrating "tolerance," "choice," and the gratification of the "autonomous individual." Certainly,
some distress is justified. Still, sociologists might want to consider the past more carefully before
they pronounce the present uniquely derelict. They might then discover th~ the present is only the
latest episode in what Christians for centuries have known as "the world."
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Notes:
Hunter's essay was first delivered as a paper at a Partisan Review conference in Austria entitled
"Breaking Traditions: Fin de Siecle 1896 and 1996." Two further books that describe a consumerist ethic
at work in the American contemporary scene are R. Laurence Moore's Selling God: American Religion
in the Marketplace of Culture, New York: Oxford, 1994; and Stephen L.Carter's The Culture of
Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion, New York: Basic Books, 1994.
Philip Schaff's Germany: Its Universities, Theology, and Religion was published in Philadelphia in 1857,
and the quotation in this review is on p. 105. On the Danish philosopher and established religion, see
Kierkegaard, Attack upon Christendom, trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton, 1966.
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Valparaiso goes to Rome
John Nordling

The program brochure said that Aestiva Romae
Latinitas (Summer Latin in Rome) is not a "crash
course or rushed Latin nightmare," but rather a
"complete and direct, concrete and gradual
experience of the entire Latin language itself ...
covering the past 2200 years." It has been held
in Rome for 8 weeks every summer since 1985.
As a Latin professor who had never been to
Rome before, I was in need of a cultural
encounter with the lands and peoples about
which I teach, or so I reasoned in one of several
grant proposals submitted to colleagues at
Valparaiso University. This essay is dedicated to
those committee members who, after reading
my proposals, did ultimately agree not only that
this "cultural encounter" was necessary for me
personally, but that Latin, and the great texts of
western civilization transmitted in that language,
remain important possibilities for study at
Valparaiso University.
The man who had organized Summer
Latin was Father Reginald T. Foster, O.C.D. A
much younger Foster had come to excel in Latin
at precisely the time that the Catholic Church
was reducing Latin's significance in mass and
curriculum. Today he serves in the Vatican as the
head of a small college of churchly Latinists who
convene each day to translate papal documents
into a polished Latin prose.
I. the first few days-de primis diebus
I came to Rome five days before Latin
instruction began so that I could experience Rome
on my own terms. One commonplace of ancient
and medieval biography is that of the wandering
pilgrim or scribe who finally encounters Rome
for the first time. How will my direct encounter
with "the city" (as the ancients designated Rome

in antiquity, simply urbs) compare to the image
of Rome in my mind, shaped by Latin texts for
many years? The writings of Augustine, Jerome,
Aquinas, Luther, Gibbon, et multi alii record
such Rome encounters, and I had envisioned a
similar process of discovery for myself.
In those first few days I saw the
Colosseum, Campidoglio, Piazza Venezia,
Pantheon, Trevi Fountain, Spanish Steps, Castel
Sant' Angelo, and the church of Santa Maria
degli Angeli. Like every overwhelmed traveller,
I revelled in the symbiosis between things
ancient and modern. One can expect at any
moment to turn a corner and find crumbling
Servian Walls (378 B.C.E.), columns of a temple
built right into a modern substructure, or Latin
inscriptions above the open, free flowing
fountains. I enjoyed transcribing Latin
inscriptions into a notebook kept for that
purpose, for Latin writing is everywhere, even
on the most modern of buildings. Copying these
contrived texts, I prepared myself for the
eventual encounter with Father Reginald.
On June 9, in front of the Basilica San
Pancrazio, located on the Janiculan Hill of
Rome, a
group of perhaps 45 people
surrounded a stout, red-complected man whose
blue eyes glowed piercingly from deep within a
balding skull. Instead of priestly garb he wore
denims and a long-sleeved work shirt buttoned
all the way up, so that he seemed to exude sweat
from every pore in the blazing sun. This was
Father Reginald-Ecce! Reginaldus erat. As I
walked up, Father Reginald was engaged in a
frequently self-interrupted roll call, enjoying old
friends and making new while checking the
names of newcomers against a master list. The
list itself seemed to provide him considerable
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glee, indicating as it did that some half of the
original inquirers had been "scared off and eliminated" by the high demands of the coming
session of study. But those who had braved the
call (now somewhat nervously twittering) would
in a few minutes cross the street and "begin
immediately. . . [glimpsing] the whole Latin
language, in active and passive exercises and fun,
from the first hour" (final letter to participants,
April1997). And that is exactly what happened.
II. daily instruction-de institutione cottidiana
The hours of Latin instruction were to take
place in a children's school run by the Sisters of
the Divine Love from Italy and Peru. All 40 to
60 people who might comprise the group at any
one time (participants, sweethearts, occasional
parents, friends from previous years, and
curious hangers-on) would convene in the
school's auditorium, seated at desks and tables
sized to elementary school aged children. It was
hot, and noisy, but Reginald thought street
noises and children screeching outside honed
the ear to listen more carefully to instructions
spoken in both Latin and English-rather the
way children were taught the Latin language
long ago, right off some busy thoroughfare.
Instruction for the Iuniores ("Junior Latinists")
would begin each day at hora secunda post
meridiem (2 p.m.), Father Reginald explained,
and would extend until 3:30, at which time
there would be an intervallum of perhaps 30
minutes. At 4, instruction began for mixed
Juniors and Seniors, and at 6, for the Seniores.
Participants were free to attend any or all of the
sessions they desired, but teaching would be
adjusted to the two levels identified. And for
those who could not get enough at the regular
sessions, there was the more informal setting
known as sub arboribus ("under the trees")
where, from 8 till dark, the really hard-core
Latinists could gather around a jug of wine,
randomly chosen texts, and spoken Latin
fellowship as the sun sank upon the darkening
hills.
No textbook existed for any of the
sessions. Each time he teaches this course,
Father Reginald ransacks monastic libraries and
archives to bring together a great chorus of Latin
texts and authors from throughout the ages. For
our reading pleasure he had assembled a few,
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rarely read "classical" texts (for example, Cicero
letters, Lucan, Publius Syrus, Plautus), and a lot
more ecclesiastical Latin texts from every period
of church history (hagiographies, papal
pronouncements, canticles, medical texts,
epitaphs, abecedaria, etc). 54 sheets in toto had
been prepared, each sheet twice the size of a
legal pad, completely covered with fine Latin
script on one side. "Lest we run out," Father
Reginald said. ''And there's a lot more where that
came from!"
So vast a collage seemed to suggest that
there is much more Latin in the world than any
one person can possibly read, even in a lifetime
as completely devoted to Latinity as Father
Reginald's. Yet Latinists ought to become aware
of this abundance because it will all become so
excellent, superb, brilliant, and worthwhile for
our students (evaluations proffered by Reginald,
no matter the text). The study of Latin
everywhere has suffered from the emergence of
so-called "classic" texts which all readers of the
language are expected to "master." An unfortunate emphasis upon the rote memorization of
standard forms for their own sake, and boring
vocabulary and grammar shoved at students for
many years, produce the same slog through
hackneyed passages of Virgil's Aeneid or Caesar
that one's own pitiable ancestors made. What is
needed today, fulminated Father on more than
one occasion, are teachers who courageously
dare to have students read, speak, and even think
living Latin thoughts from day one! Put the
"standard texts" away and pull out something
else. Allow your students to see that Latin has
many forms and colors and textures, like music
resounding down through the ages. Should they
begin to yawn at Bach and Haydn (cf. Cicero and
Caesar), let them indulge in the language's other
styles and textures and rhythms. This way they 'll
teach themselves the forms and grammar with
which we used to punish them. Get out of the
way, 0 stodgy Latin professor, and trust that the
Latin language itself will motivate, heal, convert
and inspire your diverse students just as it always
has, long before you came along! Know what
texts to use and how to present them, but allow
your students to rise to the high level Latin
requires. They will rise, you know; they have to.
Trust me in this: Credite id mihi!
Frequent tirades along these lines were

intended-obviously-for the Latin teachers of
our group, and Reginald's whole attitude
implied that if you weren't teaching Latin yet,
you soon would be; it was thus the sacred duty
of each of us to export Latinitas to the four
corners of the world, like triumphing legionnaires in Caesar's army. Though most participants were in fact high school or college
teachers, graduate students seeking to internalize the language, and undergraduates from
throughout the United States who contemplated
a career in classics, not everyone fit this profile.
Several more were Roman Catholic parish
priests, monks, seminarians-in-training, and
area students attracted to Summer Latin from
the Gregorian University in Rome. One was a
Supreme Court Justice from Sydney, and others
were from the great universities of England. The
Germans in attendance came to add English as
much as Latin to their arsenal of active
languages.
A young Russian with fluency in 5 modern
languages, Igor looked like MickJagger, and still
supports himself occasionally as a musician in a
rock band. He was preparing to take monastic
vows and needed Latin to understand the divine
liturgy. He argued that the mass should always
be conducted in Latin, no matter where public
Christian worship may occur on earth. Always
trying to understand the mysteries, or to get a
lot out of the service, or to enjoy the sermon
were for him annoying Protestant intrusions
which should be recognized as such and so
expunged. The beauty and the majesty of the
Latin mass will sustain the worshippers, he
argued, elevating them from petty contemporaneousness of the vernacular to what is timeless,
holy, eternal.
However, Father Reginald told the
idealistic Igor not only that he disagreed with
such views himself, but that Igor was crazy for
holding them: amentissimus es! ("You are quite
out of your mind!") Father Reginald enjoyed
locking horns with people on any subject, for
only Latin mattered. All other opinions,
convictions, and even heresies could be
tolerated, provided only that they contribute
positively to the learning environment. We
approached texts spontaneously, as if for the first
time. Reginald would help with the problem
areas, but he was far more interested in our

coming to terms with the fine points of a Latin
passage, or appreciating a style, than simply
deciphering broadly what it meant. Therefore,
actually say, in Latin, the passive of that active
form, the plural of that singular. How might
that verb sound in the subjunctive mood? in the
indicative? What would it look like in the
infinitive, future active participle, gerundive,
supine? Given this English sentence "He loved
the Latin language the older he became,"
Latinize it now and do so correctly! After the
shock of such a confrontation, and the chilling
effect of fifty pairs of eyes as witnesses, the mind
would kick in and Latin would come welling
forth from deep inside: Latinam eo magis
amabat linguam, quo senior fit. "Good!" Father
Reginald would beam, "You can't go any further
in Latin than that!" But those who put on airs of
Latin superiority could be humbled, quickly. He
knew each Latinist's name and breaking point
by the end of the first week, encouraging the
weak, challenging the strong, ignoring no one.
Our collective goal was to become "the best
Latinists in all the world"-ut fiatis optimi
discipuli Latini omni in mundo.
III. trips and other activities-de itineribus
aliisque actis
Provided that one was a properly prepared
Latinist, could get to Italy on one's own, and
feed and house oneself somewhere in modern
Rome, there was no charge for the Latin
instruction itself-although "free and totally
anonymous contributions" to the purse were
certainly acceptable (program brochure). Two
sets of worksheets were prepared each week,
and meticulously corrected, but there were no
grades assigned and absolutely no academic
"credit" given for the class ("damnable
obstacles" to the cause of true learning, huffed
Reginald when asked about this once).
The schedule suggested that there should
be six days of Latin instruction to one day of
travel. Early Sunday morning was Father
Reginald's preferred time for gathering the
group at one of Rome's train stations and then
leading us off on an excursion to some famous
locale. Although these trips constituted a
refreshing change from the regular routine, they
were not a vacation from the Latin enterprise.
Far from it. Each trip was "scripted" (iter

litteratum), meaning that archaeological site
plans, relevant pictures, and pages of pertinent
Latin verbiage had been compiled beforehand
into neat little booklets for every tour. To the
casual eye we were just one more tourist group
to accost the monuments of Italy. But our guide
was different: a Latin instructor who used the
very ruins to elucidate the Latin texts we held in
hand. This method of teaching Latin had an
impact even upon complete strangers. Tourists
craned to listen. Museum curators and archaeological site directors paused in their work to say
hello, for most of them knew, or had heard of
Father Reginald. Even children came running to
listen to this man who could prattle on and on
in lingua Latina.
At Ostia we sat amid the weedy ruins of the
inn where Monica, St. Augustine's mother, died,
and read the full account of her death in
Confessions 9. Looking up, I was startled to see
several of my colleagues weeping at the beauty
and humanity of the piece. We concluded the
Caesar tour beneath a massive bronze statue of
Julius Caesar overlooking the Forum, right hand
raised in the posture of adlocutio (address).
Chaplets had already been set adoringly at
Caesar's feet by modern Romans, so we added a
burning votive candle and toasted Caesar's ghost
with a fine red Falernian. Our tour of the abbey
at Fossa Nova where St. Thomas Aquinas died
in 1274 was capped by a hearty banquet of pasta,
vegetables, cheese, stone-baked pizza, and
gelato.
Rome's Catholicism continues to draw
pilgrims from throughout the world. Monks and
nuns, many in bright robes and habits, flock
regularly to the city to keep in touch with
monastic superiors, consult the Vatican archives,
fulfill spiritual quests. Most of the Latinists in
my immediate group were devoutly Roman
Catholic and I came quickly to realize that I was
the only Lutheran of the bunch. So I became
something of a sounding board for the Lutheran
faith. Many of the undergraduate Latinists had
never engaged "a real Lutheran" before and
some came to me with specific questions. Such
learning is always a two-way street, of course.
So I'd ask members of our group about specific
items in the ecclesiastical texts we were reading,
or about rituals of the daily office I had observed
in churches throughout the city. One evening
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after supper I witnessed a spirited discussion
among my Catholic friends as to whether the
(traditional) Tridentine Mass, or the (more innovative) novus ordo, is best suited for the church
at this time. A similar debate rages in
church-growth
Lutheranism
between
proponents and liturgical purists.
Father Reginald realized that, in my case, a
Lutheran minister had been admitted into his
fold of mostly Catholic sheep. For the most part
I comported myself appropriately, although I
could not keep from wincing visibly at the
"works righteousness" evident in a series of
sermons prepared by Pope Leo the Great to
inspire the faithful to generous almsgiving:
" ... by your offering God will liberate the poor
man from his toil, and you from the multitude
of your sins" (Tractatus 6.11). There is an accent
here which many Lutherans must find disconcerting, as though one's forgiveness before God
depends on almsgiving. The good works
proceeding from Christ-centered faith do, to a
point, "liberate the poor man from his toil," as
Leo says, and may even exert a salubrious effect
upon the structures of this world. But moral and
social improvements are always secondary,
incomplete, and provisional-even among
Christians, who remain sinners until the end
(Luther, Large Catechism, Creed: 57-58). Good
works are holy in God's sight only by virtue of a
faith which clings to Christ alone, and thus only
Christ remains forever. This is the type of theological reaction a Pope Leo sermon on almsgiving might evoke from many such Lutherans
as myself.
Reginald noticed my discomfiture and
asked if it was a case of Lutherans not paying
alms for theological reasons, or perhaps they
were just plain greedy! Father Reginald avoided
"pointless theological argument" (as he called
it), yet was constantly on the prowl for those
Latin texts which he knew would stir the feelings
of individual members of our group. So, for my
benefit, we read a superb Luther-Erasmus
exchange. Another Latin/Astronomy major from
Harvard insisted that we read a portion of the
Sydereus Nuncius in which Galileo excitedly
describes his discovery of the perspicillum
(telescope}. Still another college student recited
perfectly from memory a large chunk (one legalsized page, very small script) of Laurentius

Valla's In Sex Libras Elegantiarum Praefatia.
Marvels of memory and other feats of Latin
virtuosity were not uncommon in a group so
completely devoted to the one passion. Several
of the participants were resolved to converse
only in Latin during class, at meals or on a trip,
and I myself delivered a 20 minute oration de
Latina tradenda lingua apud Universitatem
Valparaisiensem (''About Teaching the Latin
language at Valparaiso University"). This talk
by "the Lutheran boy" (puer Lutheranus) was
enthusiastically received by an overflow crowd
in the auditorium, but colleagues spoke with
equal facility on a variety of other themes.
Iv. the final day and return home-de die ultimo
et domum reditu
My time in Rome was over almost as
quickly as it had begun. Time passed rapidly
because every available moment was spent to the
full on Latin endeavors. Four days before
departure I was pickpocketed late one evening
aboard bus 64. It is especially this bus which
conveys first-time pilgrims from Termini Station
to St. Peter's Basilica; on it wolves often fleece
the unsuspecting lambs. Thus was I obliged to
spend several prime hours of my last days
finding the Divisiane Stranieri ("Aliens
Department") where I filed a police report.
On my final day Father Reginald insisted
that I be the last to translate a bit of De
Apastalatu Maritima, a papal encyclical
Reginald and his associates had Latinized earlier
this year. The paragraph describes how even
sailors, far out at sea, can "earn a full
indulgence" (indulgentiam plenariam lucrari) by
attending to various disciplines a pope may
impose. This was Father Reginald's way, I think,
of saying goodbye to the lone Lutheran Latinist.
Friends of the summer crowded around to wish
me well: Vale! Fac ut valeas! Then the flight

home and preparations to teach Latin here.
This business of teaching Latin is a holy
undertaking, and important, at a university sub
cruce ("under the cross") such as Valparaiso is.
The Chapel is not St. Peter's Basilica, nor is
Valparaiso Rome, but pilgrims and scholars are
drawn here too, and the glories of Latin
literature ought to be taught well on this campus
for serious minds to ponder and engage.
Why Latin in 1997? Why should such
diligence and effort be expended nowadays
upon a discipline which apparently has no
immediate, tangible, or financial reward? This
essay has been a kind of response to that
question. If education is only a means of making
a living, of acquiring skills needed to succeed in
today's workforce, then Latin (and related
courses) may seem indeed to be a waste of time.
But if education is more than this, if it is a
precious time in one's life to consider what other
men and women, in other ages, believed was
good, holy, and true-then disciplines like Latin
still have much to offer. With them we acquire
the ability to see the world from the perspective
of the ages, sub specie aeternitatis ("under the
gaze of eternity"). It is a curious fact that most
of what mattered to Cicero thousands of years
ago matters still today-and always will matter.
Why Latin? Here is my parting shot,
drawn this time from the latest syllabus revision
of Latin 101 (I had my students stand and recite
this paragraph on the first day of class):
Our goal: A stimulating, joyful and experiential
encounter with the Latin language and just a few
of those millions of people who thought, spoke
and wrote in this glorious language ... .It is a
rare privilege and a priceless honor to study
Latin at all in this day and age. Therefore, we
shall engage ourselves to the full as we embark
upon this lifelong adventure!
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"It just isn't going to go away," Moebie
said, looking as if she wanted a cigarette.
Moebie has never smoked, to my knowledge,
but there seemed in her eyes a sort of longing for
oxygenlessness. In that condition the world
might seem other than it is.
We had been talking about the state of the
nation. Moebie tends to think, year after year,
that its condition is terminal, whereas I, the
temperamental optimist, like to assume things
are in brief remission. The principle of our relationship, Moebie's and mine, is that a host of
differences between us together constitute a
solid foundation for massive misunderstanding.
This is good, because in our conversations we
sometimes seem to cloud each other's minds so
thoroughly that outside our mutual murk the
rest of the world takes on a luminous clarity. It is
as if (and this is her savory analogy, not mine)
one emerged from a tub covered with brown
pudding and gazed thankfully at a lifesize cube
of clean sunlit lime Jell-o.
What wasn't going to go away, in the
nation, was the assertion by some large-mouthed
bastions of misbelief that the US was a
"Christian" nation. This was Moebie's
complaint. Moebie is a student of contemporary
cultural practices and not thrilled by the
of
supposedly
discredited
persistence
phenomena. It pleases her that alchemy has been
passe for some time, but TV psychics and cheap
cologne distress her, also the unfading popularity of Andrew Wyeth. I somewhat agree on
Wyeth, having seen his show last summer at the
Portland, Maine, art museum, where pictures
were accompanied by some of his breathless
pseudo-philosophical pronouncements, making
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one cringe and lunge backward into people.
"It's clear as can be," said Moebie,
speaking limely, "that some of the desires the
nation has always been driven by happen to
overlap with Christianity, but they do not arise
from Christianity, or constitute it." "People in
the US generally live by the Golden Rule, for
example, and affirm the Ten Commandments,"
she said, "and expect to lay up for themselves
treasures on earth, but two of these principles
are ancient Hebrew notions, and the other is
secular monotheism."
She had me murked already. "I don't
recognize that expression," I ventured. "Secular
monotheism?"
"You can call it something else," she said.
"You can call it materialist narcissism." "Or," she
said, "Sheila-ism." "The woman," she explained,
seeing the murk in my eyes, "who, like a lot of
other Americans, was unabashedly her own god,
in Robert Bellah's Habits of the Heart." "Mox
Vapor," she said, "got it about right."
The lime Jell-o slowly resolved itself into
the unsmiling visage of the German sociologist
Weber, whose Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism had been the astringent aftershave of
the day. We had all looked upon our naked countenances and then shuddered under a splash of
fierce alcohol. Weber had shown that we were
no longer complexly Puritanical, sinful but
virtuously weeping and self-flagellating. Instead
we were one-dimensional self-aggrandizers,
parlayers, gleeful accumulators, shaking hands
with God and patting him on the back in that
comfortably mindless boosterish way. I keep
meaning to read Weber; probably this digest is
not doing him justice. We went to church in
order to get rich. And we had to accept getting
rich because it was rude to reject God's

American promise.
"Why isn't it going away, ever?" I asked,
reverting to Moebie's complaint. "People these
days are surely," I said, "getting clear in their
minds that this is a mixed nation, influenced to
some degree by Christian teachings of one brand
or another, but also driven by desires that have
no theological grounding." "People are surely
not saying that the US was founded as a
Christian nation," I said. ''Americans do not
study history, and therefore are not in a position
to say what the Founding consisted of."
I went on in this vein, being acquainted
with some American thoughts and practices, as a
teacher of American literature. "Try these three
propositions," I said helpfully. ''All are foundational for the United States, but none is
Christian, and indeed all are in a sense antiChristian." Moebie's eyes lit up without evident
sincerity, like the self-conscious glary light in a
Wyeth picture.
''Anybody," I said, "will cite as foundational these three things: Equal Justice Under
Human Law; Government by Consent of the
Governed, Through Franchise; and The Right
of the Individual to Live Unoppressed." "But
none of that is biblical," I pointed out. "In the
Bible, justice is conferred only by rulers obedient
to the imperial ordinances of God."
"Franchise," I went on, "is not in the picture at
all; instead, authority is." ''And finally" (I swept
on with impressive clarity), "while the Bible
thinks freedom from oppression is a good thing,
it does not suppose that it's some sort of civil
right."
''All this may be true," responded Moebie,
"but people still misbelieve that with America
God tried something new and did His/Her best.
He/She founded the nation, and set it upon a hill
and blessed its undertakings, and confirmed its
providential design by having Adams and
Jefferson die on the same day, July 4, 1826,
exactly 50 years after the Declaration." "They
keep saying this," she said, "and they will keep
on saying it." "People are not interested," she
said, "in the murky confluence of circumstances
at the time of the Founding, but only in a few
glary occurrences such as Franklin's sometime
use of the word 'God."'
"They did sometimes use that word," I
mused. "Even, I think, the indifferent deist

Jefferson and several of the other important
inscribers."
"They were not above guile," she said.
I thought this a bit harsh. None of the
books I read as a middle-schooler, about the
Presidents or the Founders, would have
introduced guile. This was a sort of lOth-grade
word, I supposed, the year in which pupils are
supposed to learn to be skeptical, even a bit
astringently antinomian. Instead, though, in
lOth grade they lose their bodies in baggy outfits
and their minds in video arcades. Even in premall, pre-loosefit epochs Americans have historically eluded lOth grade, and thus have never felt
a wake-up splash on their minds.
Guile would mean that the Founders
sometimes used language as pudding, to comfort
early citizens, whether or not they themselves
sincerely affirmed its sugars and starches. "Yet
the Founding generation," I said, "reputedly was
driven by motives more noble, on the whole,
than most generations, even if not overwhelmingly Christian."
''Ah!" said Moebie, prolonging the syllable
sententiously. "You believe then, heretically, that
there is something new under the sun." "You
think," she said, "that guile in politicians
appeared only later, a phenomenon arising after
this reputed purity of the Founding generation
had run its course." "I think it was not," she
said, "that way."
I had to agree with her to some extent.
Astringent words of historian Henry Adams
splashed into my mind-his characterization of
Alexander Hamilton as "equally ready to
support a system he utterly disbelieved in as one
that he liked." Right behind Hamilton splashed
Jefferson, whom New Englanders considered "a
moral coward. Justly or unjustly they thought
he did not tell the truth."
Others I was willing to mention out loud.
"Henry Adams, whose judgment is worth
something," I reported conscientiously,
"thought very highly of George Washington and
John Marshall." "And," I added, "of his greatgrandfather John Adams."
Moebie glared, then faded. "Show me how
often these estimable men spoke sincerely of
Jesus Christ their Savior," she said, "and having
done that, remember that that in itself does not
establish a Christian nation, any more than

rampant church attendance did, in the olden
days." "As I stated," she said, "there is some
overlap between Christian and secular
practices, and public figures mouthed pieces
of Christianity to serve self-interest." "I might
add," she said, "that they wanted to look a bit
spiritual in case posterity leaned that way."
Her notion of rampant church
attendance was not entirely correct; I had accidentally acquired some information on that
subject. Before stopping in Portland, Maine, I
had spent a few days in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and browsed used bookstores.
Planning to visit Cooperstown, New York, I
bought William Cooper's Town, which won
Pulitzer and Bancroft prizes for historian Alan
Taylor. It turns out that in 1795, in the frontier
county of Otsego, in upstate New York, less
than a quarter of the adults belonged to a
church. The founder and patron of
Cooperstown village had not been spiritually
avid. "If the judge had shown the same
initiative and generosity for founding a church
that he lavished on the waterworks, brewery,
library, academy, and Freemasonic lodge,
Cooperstown would not have gone so long
without a settled ministry."
It was a village "dominated by profane
rather than pious men," and the "worldly institutions" they established "rendered more
difficult the prospects of establishing a
church." The stores "retailed alcohol by the
gallon," and Methodist circuit-riders saw the
yokels as "a Sabbath-breaking, irreligious
race," about the same picture of the frontier as
Crevecoeur depicted in his famous Letters
from an American Farmer of 17 81.
"So," Moebie said, tuning in on my
musing, "we can doubt not only that the
Founders were notably Christian, but that the
early settlements were notably pious."
"Look," she said. "To call this a Christian
nation, you establish three propositions. First,
show that some founding principles and
practices were distinctively Christian," she
said, "not just routinely consistent with secular
desires." "You also," she said, "have to show
that the founders, when they mentioned God,
were more than deists and guileists."
"Finally," she said, thinking of Alan Taylor,
"you show that the preponderance of citizens
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m the founding generations were, on the
various wilderness frontiers, North and South,
as serious about Christian doctrine and praxis
as the Massachusetts Puritans had been on
their seacoast, citing evidence other than fair
prices on distilled spirits."
She added, on a sort of roll, "If you
discover the nation was not Christian by
founding, then what? The US just sort of
became Christian at some later date? And how
and why?"
While she was delivering her trinity of
propositions, like three formidable pans of
Jell-0, I silently offered a prayer of thanks that
I had not mentioned Taylor's passage about
William Cooper in later years : "Formerly
contemptuous of churches, Cooper became
their ardent supporter-but for social and
political purposes rather than out of any
personal piety."
He and "many other
Federalists driven from office" began to hope
that "churches would reclaim the common
people from their infatuation with
democracy." This was the first decade of the
19th century, and Moebie would surely have
confused this founder's pragmatic or sly
ardency with guile.
"You are now asking, 'So what?"' said
Moebie. "So why is it a bad thing that it isn't
going away, this notion of the US as a Christian
nation?"
"Yes," I said, perhaps too inardently.
"How much does it matter if people go around
thinking and saying this is a Christian nation."
"Christianity is, after all," I said, "the
dominant religion, and will be more so as we
become more Hispanic." "To call the US
Christian," I explained, "is to tell the world
that the US is not predominantly Jewish or
Muslim or Buddhist or animist or pagan, or
secular monotheist, or a combination thereof."
Moebie responded brutally, as if to a fly
on one of the nonexistent gelatin slabs. We
were chatting in the breakfast nook, a
distinctive site marking the house as having
been foundationally a Christian house of the
Christian 1950s.
"You now have Christianity defined as
the space not occupied by other faiths and
nonfaiths," she said. "You call this, I suppose,
a solid foundation on which Christians may

badger and intrude on everyone else, and
legislate and moralize to suit themselves."
''Accepting this lamely murky definition, we then
will have to be content," she said, "with any
other approximations and distortions that
people may produce in arguing about religion
and the nation." "That, I suppose," she said,
"suits your notion of adequate public
discourse?" She swept her arm across the table
where the Jell-0 in my mind's eye had now
gained a foundation of limp lettuce leaves and a
superstructure of white Cool Whip. The nook
was becoming more Christian by the moment.
I wondered whether to tell Moebie I had
to agree. It wasn't going to go away, this

unstable and nutritionless notion of America as
a Christian nation. As an old friend, temperamentally cursed with optimism, I wanted to
assure her that by halfway through the next
millennium we would revive lOth grade, and
thus gain a more incisive critique in the US of
relations between church and nation. But it
wasn't going to happen soon. The immediate
future in the US was going to be agitated and
messy, like pudding on the palms and fingers of
unutensiled alchemists. Not a pretty site.
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One can tell those that are dying
by the way they tend to linger
in conversation. Their eyes smile
at some far reach in their memory of you,
gliding past the abrasiveness
to perch on a flowering limb.
And there are poets who die
and are celebrated in their magazine
with lines that made it
through the controversies,
brief epigraphs from a life of reaching out:
"Love? Ah yes, ah yes. I remember."
These people pause at their mail boxes,
turning towards you as they work the little doors.
Their eyes fill with tears.
Their hands do not hurry.
One last time
they ask to be your friend.

William Aiken

From Dogwood, faithfully yours,

c.v.
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That great proponent of Social Gospel activism,
Walter Rauschenbusch, made this exasperated
assessment of early Twentieth Century
Lutheranism: "Thus far Lutheranism has buried
its ten talents in a tablecloth of dogmatic theory
and kept its people from that share in the social
awakening which is their duty and right"
(Christianizing the Social Order, 1913).
It seems that things have not changed very
much. Many heavy hitting theologians have
more recently criticized the alleged "quietism"
in Lutheran theological ethics. Among them
number Reinhold and Richard Niebuhr, Paul
Tillich and Karl Barth. Contemporary Lutheran
theologians have spent a good deal of time and
energy defending Lutheran ethics from such
charges. As a Lutheran, you cannot easily escape
the "weak on social ethics" designation. Indeed,
when I criticized the undue enthusiasm for
American democratic capitalism of several of my
ethicist colleagues, they retorted that it must be
a difficult thing to try to live up to that slightly
oxymoronic calling-Lutheran ethicist.
Sociological studies have indicated that
Lutherans, members of perhaps the largest
European heritage group in America (the
German-Americans), are underrepresented in
high political office. Lutherans can't claim a
President, even though a much smaller German
sect, the River Brethren of Kansas, brought forth
Dwight Eisenhower.
When one looks at the highly visible elite
sectors of American life, one is tempted to come
to the conclusion that Lutheranism simply
doesn't produce "winners." Perhaps there are
some anonymous Lutherans occupying them,
but by and large the positions at the highest level
of politics, media, business and education seem
rather unpopulated by identifiable Lutherans.
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We simply don't seem to incubate the kind of
people who show up on the cover of Time or
Newsweek magazine.
While I will qualify this judgment in a bit,
it does seem that Lutherans are not the public
hero type. A number of reasons have been put
forth as to why this is so. One is that our strong
ethnic traditions have kept us isolated from the
mainstream. Even our heroes who could have
perhaps "made" it in the larger world remained
within the friendly confines of their ethnoreligious cultures. Another is that our leaders
and theologians have been rather in-grown and
church-centered. They do not seek a wider
public visibility. A third is that the Lutheran
theological tradition itself leads toward a
grateful acceptance or tolerance of what is given.
Lutherans do not rock the boat with public
social criticism or activism. Closely related to
that religious quietism is a cynical view of
politics and public life in general that is
attributed to Lutheran theology; the authorities
are ordained by God and must be obeyed but
that doesn't mean we have to like them.
For the most part the authorities have the
thankless but necessary job of providing "dikes
to sin." Finally, there is a genuine humility and
diffidence in the Lutheran ethos that shuns
attention or ostentation, let alone glory. How
many Lutherans have bumper stickers on their
cars? Not as many as Baptists or Methodists, I'd
wager.
Does this mean that our permanent destiny
is that depicted by Garrison Keillor in his Lake
Wobegon stories? Does Lutheranism shape the
ordinary people of small town and rural, and
now suburban, America in such a way that they
remain invisible Everyman and Everywoman?
Or, if they rise above that level of ordinariness,

do they soon lose their souls or their
Lutheranism?
Now I will begin my counter-attack.
Lutheranism in America has produced a
significant number of the visible elite, and many
of them publicly identify themselves with the
Lutheran ethos. In the following I will submit a
number of candidates in this category, though I
hasten to add that my list is limited by my own
knowledge and Sitz im Leben. Certainly others
might come up with many more possibilities,
which suggests that we Lutherans should take up
a more systematic account of our "elite laity" to
use a phrase of the late Mark Gibbs. In the
following I will list only those of roughly
contemporary times; a broader historical survey
would turn up many more.
Interestingly enough, the most visible
Lutheran elite seem to be clustered among the
intelligentsia. This is not so odd when one
considers the intellectuality of the Lutheran
tradition. "How dare you not know what can be
known!" roared Luther. The intellectual attitude
has a long history among us. Among our kin it
tends to be preferred over politics.
No doubt one of our most famous contemporary intellectuals is Martin Marty. A fellow
townsman from that abode of smart Germans at
West Point, Nebraska, Marty is one of the most
recognizable names among public intellectuals.
(Others who have been connected with West
Point are the Bohlmann brothers, Fred Niedner,
Oswald Hoffmann from Snyder, a suburb of
West Point, and yours truly.) Marty's intellectual
work and commentaries on historical and
contemporary religious life in America are
constantly sought by the elite and popular
centers of American culture.
Though more known in elite than in
popular centers, Jaroslav Pelikan is certainly as
formidable a public intellectual as Marty. Pelikan
has occupied a number of prestigious academic
positions in two of America's great universities,
and his scholarly work is greatly respected and
widely known among the highly educated. He
played an important part in insisting on the irreducibility of religious conviction and activity in
the midst of a secularizing intellectual culture.
He has also played an important role in the
critique of American religion in its manifold
forms.

Kenneth Thompson is a major scholarly
figure in the field of international relations. He
writes important works and administers the
Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University
of Virginia. Jean Bethke Elshtain is increasingly
visible as a public intellectual.
In theology, national figures include
George Lindbeck, George Fore!!, Carl Braaten
and Robert Jenson, though we have others of
like quality whose voices are more limited to
Lutheran circles. We have a number of high-level
Lutheran educational administrators, perhaps
the most visible among them the retiring chancellor of the University of Minnesota, Nils
Hasselmo.
Among the "harder to categorize" is
Richard Neuhaus, who, in his earlier Lutheran
incarnation, was a Lutheran public theologian
of high visibility. Indeed, in the field of religion
and public life it is difficult to name a more influential figure in American life. Neuhaus' ventures
into social activism, organization-founding,
writing and editing have earned him a place
among the American elite.
Lutherans have produced a number of
notable contemporary writers, foremost among
them, John Updike. While no longer a member
of a Lutheran congregation, Updike was
nurtured in a Pennsylvania Lutheran culture that
appears repeatedly in his literary work. He
expresses a number of Lutheran themes, among
them the paradoxical character of human nature
and history. Walter Wangerin is an increasingly
celebrated writer whose work is shaped by the
Lutheran perspective. Garrison Keillor, now a
Lutheran but always an accurate evoker of
Lutheran ways, has gone a long way to make the
Lutheran ethos winsomely familiar among radio
listeners across the country.
Though Lutherans are under-represented
among the country's political elite, we do claim
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, William
Rehnquist. Ernest Hollings and Paul Simon have
been well-known Lutheran senators. Edwin
Meese was a major figure in the Reagan administration. The Chaplain to the Senate is James
Ford, who has held the position for many years.
Other senators and representatives come from
states with large Lutheran populations, who also
frequently elect Lutheran governors, the most
visible among the current crop being Arne

Carlson of Minnesota.
The military, including its chaplaincies, has
had its share of Lutheran leaders, but the names
of those Lutherans have not been highly visible
to the general public. Lutherans have "made a
name" for themselves as leaders in the voluntary
sector. Charles Lutz has recently published a
book entitled Loving Neighbors Far and Near in
which he recognizes Lutheran leaders like
Arthur Simon and David Beckmann. The former
founded Bread for the World while the latter,
after important positions with the World Bank,
is currently executive director of Bread for the
World.
Although certainly not household names,
there are major leaders in the business world
who are Lutheran in a serious way. William
Diehl, himself a well-known writer on lay
ministry, has profiled some of those leaders in
his In Search of Faithfulness.
Garrison Keillor depicts the Lutheran folk
of Lake Wobegon as ordinary farmers, teachers,
pastors, storekeepers, wives, husbands, mayors,
bankers, n'er-do-wells, and other assorted types.
They work out their Christian lives in ordinary
places but sometimes have extraordinary
insights into mortality, sin, grace and duty.
Keillor is onto something.
Lutherans, as well as other Christians, I
have argued in another book (Ordinary Saints:
An Introduction to the Christian Life) are
"ordinary saints." They are ordinary in two basic
ways. They are regarded as saints (holy) before
God, not because of their extraordinary deeds
or even unshakeable faith, but rather because of
the extraordinary grace of God in Christ that
holds them fast even in their weakest moments.
Lutherans believe they are justified by grace
through faith on account of Christ, not by their
deeds. They are also ordinary saints in their
relation to their fellow human beings. They live
out their faith, love and hope in ordinary places
of responsibility that God has given them. They
accept their "given" locations with gratitude and
their faith becomes active in love and justice in
those places.
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Thus, Lutherans are not only receptive in
terms of grace; they show a similar posture in
the categories of time and space. They receive
with gratitude the "places" they have been given.
In them they express a marked "dailiness" that
is often unrecognized by a world that celebrates
the unusual and dramatic. It is in the ordinary
times of work, play, love and worship that the
Christian life is lived.
Add together these three elements-justification by grace, locatedness, and dailinessand you do not have the formula for worldbeaters in the public sphere. Glory and power
are not Lutheran concepts; bearing the cross is a
more likely one. Further, they do not worry
overmuch about their election and signs of the
same. They are less likely to think they are
glorifying God in their callings than humbly
helping their neighbor. They shun the schemes
of works righteousness so heavy in some forms
of Protestantism. They don't even make the
"decisions for Christ" that some of our more
Pelagian brothers and sisters are wont to make.
Indeed, the Lutheran tradition may tend to
make them footsoldiers of the Lord rather than
his generals or colonels. Certainly, they may
have a few of those elite and perhaps a few more
sergeants and lieutenants. But their piety is more
fit for humbler things. They take seriously the
paradoxical nature of life on earth.
But not to worry. They will get their
measure of heroes and luminaries. Some will
step forward in times of crisis. There have been
a goodly number and there will be others. But in
this era of an unraveling civil society, the real
heroes might well be those who exercise and
maintain their public and private commitments
in less auspicious ways. The most helpful
engagement with the public world might be
through faithful husbands and wives, mothers
and fathers, workers and teachers, doctors and
lawyers, volunteers, pastors, and laity. Without
the healthy "small platoons" that these
Christians sustain, there won't be any public life
worthy of the name anyway.

f

liberalism's last supper
Jennifer Voigt

The question "What constitutes political
action?" has a rhetorical texture though it
demands hard answers. What do you do when
the political situation becomes unbearable?
What do you do to keep it from becoming so? Is
it enough simply to think and write or does
devotion to ideals and causes require greater
sacrifice? It muddles our subtlest minds. The
British Romantics were divided on the subject.
Wordsworth's greatest contribution to that era
of enormous political upheaval was largely
aesthetic, and in fact, he left France just as the
Revolution was heating up and just as Mary
Wollstonecraft arrived. Coleridge was paralyzed
by words, and we all know what Byron chose to
do. The question perplexed William Godwin his
whole life. He settled for writing, though his
choice failed to satisfy him.
Neither is political neutrality an answer to
our question. Nikita Mikhalkor's sad Burnt by
the Sun likens political statement to nourishment when his characters posit two equally
unhealthy visions of neutrality. Like Switzerland,
one character says to another who vows to
remain neutral in a small domestic dispute, the
neutral person is "overfed and apathetic." On
the contrary, the neutral character replies, "I'm
starving and impassioned."
Burnt by the Sun may not find neutrality
acceptable, but it also reveals the consequences
of political action. No one survives that film
intact, if they survive it at all. Taking action
requires a type of surrender to one's cause, an
acknowledgement that it is a force larger than
oneself. The question hiding behind "What
constitutes political action" is "What sacrifice
does my cause require?"
The Last Supper, a black comedy directed
by Stacy Title, answers these questions with a

third question: "How are we to go about taking
action?" Delightfully, Title and screenwriter Dan
Rosen leave the camera to ask this question, as it
watches the characters get stuck, and then finally
sink into the quicksand of the former two.
Though about twenty years ago Thomas
Gutierrez Alea made a film called The Last
Supper, based on a true story, which reenacts a
Cuban slave owner's act of penance, Title's The
Last Supper is about a group of five graduate
students, Luke, Paulie, Jude, Pete, and Marc,
who, after accidentally killing a racist dinner
guest, decide to invite other people with whom
they share a difference of opinion to dinner, and
poison them with wine laced with arsenic. These
five justify their extreme measures by evoking
our first question. Deciding that buying crueltyfree mascara is not enough of a sacrifice to
"liberalism"-which they define loosely as a
group of causes and ideals that are largely green,
pro-choice, anti-homophobic, and anti-racistthey agree to practice "justifiable homicide" as a
way to extinguish "evil force[s] in the world."
The students, however, appear more
comfortable with liberalism as a lifestyle rather
than a belief system. The students lead the life of
the educated bourgeois, full of good food, good
conversation, organic gardening, and eating the
salad after the main course, "European style." It
is the life that Kotov, in Burnt by the Sun, can
never enter, despite the Communist Revolution,
despite his honors, despite his marriage into a
well-educated family, because he does "not
speak French." The same class-barrier that exists
between Kotov and his wife's family divides the
students from Zack, their first victim. The
students first smell blood when they discover
Zack's occupation (truck driver), and when they
study his accent and demeanor. Even before he

brings up a sensitive topic the students have
insulted him, suggesting sarcastically, "I'm sure
you're a lot smarter then we are, Zack." When
Zack mentions that he fought in the Gulf War,
the film glimpses the privilege of place that the
students' liberalism allows them. They can
despise war because for them, unlike for Zack,
participation in a war is not a career option.
The class hatred that erupts during that first
dinner emphasizes the students' immaturity
when it comes to ethics, which is only underscored by their decision to justify Zack's death
by killing more people. These may be graduate
students, but every Sunday night they appear to
be reliving the Philosophy requirement from
their freshman year. They equate each one of
their victims with Hitler, believing that if they
poison say, the teenager suing her school for
making her take a sex-education class, that they
will spare the world another Holocaust. The
students do not realize, as the film does, that
their perennial question, "If you were a time
traveller, and you met the young Hitler in
Austria in the twenties, would you kill him?"
requires something beyond a yes or a no. The
students confuse the hypothetical with the real.
In response they fight fascism with fascism.
Though they invite their guests to dinner for
"conversation" no conversation actually occurs.
The desire to eradicate ideas other than their
own seduces them into committing more and
more murders until the object of the meal
becomes death itself.
Rosen's screenplay plays with the word
"conscious," utilizing it in various ways to
connote political, moral, and even physical
consciousness. When Jude reflects on the events
taking place around her and asks herself "Am I
conscious ... am I here?" her question's significance equals in weight Paulie's linguistic
blunder by which she declared that she "died"
long ago. These are, of course, ways the film
announces the students' spiritual unconsciousness, the death of their souls. As they
concoct their plan to rid the world of the forces
of evil, one of them offers a protest, crying, "You
cannot shake your fist in God's face and get
away with it!" But their spiritual deaths come as
the result of shaking their fists in God's face.
When Luke confronts Sheriff Stanley in the
tomato garden we see Adam hiding from God.
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And in that confrontation Luke brazenly strikes
down the law.
So why is the law there anyway? Though the
students refuse to pray they are conscious that
perhaps their actions are not as justifiable as they
think. They know that they cannot get away
with shaking their fists in God's face. Marc
paints a tribute to Michaelangelo on the dining
room ceiling. There, above the table that
doubles as a sacrificial altar, we see God giving
life to man. The secondary plot, about a local
Sheriff who won't give up the search for a
missing girl, functions almost as an overlay, a
transparency which, when laid over the main
plot, helps to create a larger meaning. Sheriff
Alice Stanley is really more a metaphor than a
character. Her refusal to end her search for the
little girl represents an uncompromising search
for the truth. God searches for Adam and Eve in
the garden.
But what of those of us who share the
students' concerns? What of those of us who,
before the 1996 election made it a bad word,
called ourselves liberal? Are we to believe, like
Luke, Paulie, Jude, Marc, and Pete, that unless
we murder our enemies we contradict ourselves?
Is this a reactionary film? Does it allow the right
wing to triumph? Some critics find The Last
Supper undermining itself, and have charged it
with alienating its audience-liberals-by
laughing in its face. But I fear these critics let the
film confuse them, not realizing that it uses its
characters' ethical dilemmas to consider larger
ones, and it does it subtly, without an overwhelming didacticism. The Last Supper identifies in its protagonists a need to ground their
actions in a sense of morality. It says, in other
words, if faith without works is dead, action
without faith is equally moribund. The students'
refusal to say grace before meals is not merely a
political statement which aligns them against the
sins and abuses of the Church, but a refusal to
acknowledge what their conscience tells themthat their true hunger is one for sustenance
beyond what sits before them on the table. As
the number of bodies fertilizing their tomatoes
grows, the quality of food they serve diminishes:
they begin the film with sumptuous meals and
end ordering pizza and eating off paper plates.
Their blood lust increases, the cobalt bottle with
the bad wine glows in the middle of the table.

When I use the word "morality" in connection
with "belief" and "faith," I don't mean to imply
that the students lack a sense of right and wrong.
Indeed, their sense of right and wrong is strong
-how else could they do what they do? What
they do lack is something to shape them, to
direct them, and to inform their actions. The
Christian emphasis on grace often leads us to
forget that grace itself is a gift, and that equally
important is the all to live our lives within
certain parameters. We are to derive a greater
sense of right and wrong from a basic sense of
right and wrong-like the Commandments. No
matter how well "intentioned" the students'
sacrifices (clearly, preventing new Holocausts is
a virtuous goal), their actions are hollow, their
souls are dead, and it isn't long before they
become the very people they set out to conquer.
When they do finally encounter "Satan" they
lack the vision to know how to behave. They fail
to realize that action, like faith, comes from deep

COMING HOME

Lucky in love, I ride the same flat plains
I rode before they sent me overseas
to burn in jungles, humming the same
sad country words. I might have been a sheik,
born rich with tawny, long-veiled daughters,
oil wells and sons enough for an army.
Aging, I might have strolled rose gardens,
raising and picking hybrids for parties.
After the madness of Saigon, I flew home
to help raise babies who have moved away.
My wife's green eyes are jade and rainbows.
We glide on porch swing chains we didn't hang,
the sagging house and barn Grandfather gave,
my wife rocking, looking down, patting my face.

Walter McDonald

within the person. It is organic, a way of facing
the world, and not reactive, a form of defence.
Talking about The Last Supper without giving
away the ending is difficult because so much
depends on the climax and denouement. It is a
black comedy, however, which means that it
takes pleasure in its protagonists' hubris. The
film makes sure that triumph and defeat
accompany each other during its own reenactment of the Last Supper.
So how are liberals to behave to ensure that
good triumphs over evil? What is a liberal to do
when the political situation becomes unbearable,
or even when it appears fine? The Last Supper
watches its characters through a lens colored by
a strong belief in a moral universe, and it calls
for a sacrifice of humility, rather than pride in
one's own self-righteousness, before one's
beliefs.

f

Bruce Kuklick and D.G. Hart, eds.
Religious Advocacy and American
History. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
1997. 233 pp.
These days, Wheaton College
Is seeking rather assiduously to
overcome "the scandal of the evangelical mind." With scholars like
Mark Noll at the helm, the college
has attained an intellectual selfconfidence that has made it an
important locus of Christian scholarship in the United States-and a
place of engagement with intellectuals outside the evangelical orbit.
One evidence of this shift is the
recently-held "Consultation on
Advocacy and the Writing of
American History," a conference
which featured not only prominent
evangelicals but non-evangelical and
non-Christian historians among the
participants. Their papers largely
form the basis of Religious Advocacy
and American History. All of the
book's essays deal, in one way or
another, with the marginalization of
religion and its Christian interpreters by the American historical
profession, the causes of this
condition, and what can or ought to
be done about it.
The result is a book whose
strength is at the same time its
weakness. On the one hand, it is
striking to see Eerdmans publish
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essays of Noll and George Marsden
alongside those of their secular
critics, Bruce Kuklick and Murray G.
Murphey. It is no less remarkable
that the editors of this volume are
Kuklick (University of Pennsylvania)
and D. G. Hart, the librarian and
church historian of the Orthodox
Presbyterian Church's Westminister
Seminary (East). It demonstrates that
American evangelical scholars are
serious about engaging both their
sympathetic allies and not always
sympathetic opponents on the role
of religion in higher education.
But-like many first efforts at
conversation-there is no particular
cohesiveness to the discussion,
something which the editors readily
admit. Indeed, the author of the
trenchant afterword, Leo Ribuffo,
notes that many of the authors talk
past each other, rather than directly
engage their respective arguments.
This does not prevent several
authors from
bringing new
perspectives into the issue of why
religion is neglected in historical
writing-Paul Boyer's analysis of
why religion is frequently omitted in
history textbooks is one such casebut the book's rather disparate
character may be frustrating to some
readers.
Much of the book's value, then,
rests on the exploration of several
subthemes within the book. The

most persistent of these subthemesreally the subtext of the bookmight be called "how a Christian can
be a good historian." This topic is
most thoroughly explored by Noll
and the humorous Grant Wacker, as
well as voices outside, or at the edges
of, the evangelical world, including
by
Catherine
contributions
Albanese, Paul Carter, Elizabeth
Fox-Genovese and Leslie Woodcock
Tender. Kuklick's critique of
Christian history-writing, while
cryptic, is also a stimulating contribution to this issue. Religious
Advocacy and American History may
be most useful for Christian
historians interested
m the
philosophy of history.
Another compelling subtheme
concerns the prospects of Christians
finding their own recognized niche
within the academy. Marsden,
whose essay leads the book,
champions the right of Christians to
participate as Christians in the
research university, much the way
other "advocacy" groups, like
feminists and African Americans, do.
In an age of perspectivalism,
Marsden argues, there is no basis for
excluding
explicit
Christian
perspectives, provided Christian
scholars distinguish themselves as
scholars.
Religious Advocacy,
however, casts more doubt about
Marsden's chances for success than

he might have hoped. The nonreligious contributors to the book,
Eugene Genovese, Kuklick and
Murphey, are all senior scholars,
hostile to the multicultu~a! identity
politics of the academy, and think
truth-loving Christians fools for
trying to find common ground with
post-objectivist scholars. It is telling,
perhaps, that secular postmodernists
and champions of other advocacy
groups are not represented in this
book. Marsden, Noll, and others
have tried to find a sensible middle
ground between the old rationalistic
science and the rather fluid notions
of truth now au courant in the
humanities, but it seems that only

the losers-the defenders of the
older,
more
rationalistic,
paradigm-are ready for a conversation.
Among the Christian contributions, it is Hart's article which
diverges most from Marsden's
vision, and is entitled, "What's So
Special about the University,
Anyway?" Hart argues that the
modern society in general and the
modern university in particular are,
given their socioeconomic aims,
congenitally incapable of generating
Christian minds like Edwards,
Luther and Wesley, or, for that
matter, any higher intellectual life.
Not surprisingly, Hart is pessimistic

about the possibilities of a turnaround as long as consumer capitalism triumphs, and his affection for
medieval universities and antebellum seminaries as the models for
Christian intellectual community
only demonstrates the apparent
hopelessness of our situation. But for
those of us in Christian higher
education, it is Hart's essay which
most directly points to the need for
a countercultural, church-related
college, and its promise of human
wholeness, intellectual vision, and
spiritual redemption.
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